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Spatial Variation in the ‘Muslim Vote’ 
in Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh, 2014
Raphael Susewind, Raheel Dhattiwala
In this paper, we propose to reconcile the controversial 
debate on Muslim “vote banks” in India by shifting the 
spatial focus from statewide assessments to the level 
of constituencies. With the example of Gujarat and 
Uttar Pradesh in the 2014 general elections, and using 
an innovative booth-level ecological inference model, 
we show that Muslims might indeed vote en bloc for or 
against certain parties, but they tend to do so in a much 
more localised way than previously assumed. While 
public Muslim support for the Bharatiya Janata Party did 
not translate into electoral support in most places, there 
are important exceptions to this trend – and at least in 
the case of Uttar Pradesh, their support for competing 
parties followed a fairly complex spatial pattern. 
We further explore this spatial variation in Muslim 
vote pattern by looking at the moderating impact of 
minority concentration, violent communal history, and 
ethnic coordination and conclude with a call for more 
disaggregated research. 
How do Muslims vote? This pervasive question in Indian politics gained additional momentum during the 16th Lok Sabha elections, both politically and ethically. 
The elevation of the chief minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi 
of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to prime minister ensured 
a steady debate on the dichotomy of the BJP’s rise under Modi: 
inclusive economic development on the one hand – but on the 
other, the shadow of Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002 
during BJP rule and in Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh (UP), in 
2013, the latter ostensibly linked to the BJP’s political aspira-
tions in the state. Given the legacy of the party and its leader, 
would Muslims vote en bloc against the BJP? Or would they 
prioritise economic development over religious antagonism, as 
some commentators speculated?
Academically, explaining the Muslim vote is crucial in gaining 
insight into voting behaviour for minority ethnic groups. The 
assumption of the bloc vote – a bloc being a group of voters 
with the same preference ordering – is not per se  implausible, 
especially in contexts with high ethnic polarisation and/or low 
party fractionalisation. It is founded on the premise of har-
nessing greater political control for a minority elector group, if 
electors in the group vote together in a particular way (e g, 
Penrose 1946; Chandra 2007a; 2007b). Recent scholarship how-
ever departs from this assumption (e  g, Devasher 2014), and 
there is substantial disagreement over whether “vote banks” 
empirically exist at all in India – they certainly do not exist in 
the sense of uniform voting. But what about strong trends? 
In this paper, we propose to reconcile the debate to some ex-
tent by shifting the spatial focus from statewide assessments to 
the level of constituencies. We show that Muslims might indeed 
vote en bloc for or against certain parties, but they tend to do so 
in a much more localised way than previously assumed.
To explore this spatial variation, we have to move beyond 
scientifi c poll surveys, because these only allow robust infer-
ence on a statewide level given their limited sample size and 
overall design. The 2014 National Election Study (NES) con-
ducted by Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS  – 
arguably the best available survey – for instance sampled their 
respondents from only 56 booths in 14 assembly segments 
across 12 of 26 constituencies in Gujarat and from 164 booths in 
41 assembly segments across 38 of 80 constituencies in UP 
(Lokniti Team 2014). If Muslim en bloc voting would indeed be 
localised and not add up to a statewide trend, the NES would miss 
it. More generally, surveys can be biased in contexts where 
political dissent is disapproved. Survey responses in states like 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Multi-Booth Stations in Gujarat
 Coverage of Multi-Booth Stations Demography and Votes in
  Multi-Booth Stations
PC N Booths Electors Muslims BJP INC AAP
  % % % % % %
Whole state 31,027 69 73 10 61 31 1
Kachchh (1) 1,101 60 70 16 62 31 2
Banaskantha (2) 998 57 61 10 60 32 1
Patan (3) 1,201 66 70 13 54 40 0
Mahesana (4) 1,269 79 80 6 58 37 0
Sabarkantha (5) 946 44 49 10 51 43 0
Gandhinagar (6) 1,627 92 93 7 68 25 2
Ahmedabad East (7) 1,495 91 92 9 65 31 1
Ahmedabad West (8) 1,390 94 95 16 64 31 2
Surendranagar (9) 1,119 59 64 9 57 34 1
Rajkot (10) 1,281 76 81 9 62 33 1
Porbandar (11) 1,151 69 72 9 64 0 1
Jamnagar (12) 947 57 61 16 59 35 1
Junagadh (13) 1,232 73 75 14 56 39 2
Amreli (14) 1,194 70 74 9 54 34 2
Bhavnagar (15) 1,168 68 71 7 61 27 6
Anand (16) 1,386 88 89 11 51 44 0
Kheda (17) 1,346 77 79 12 59 35 0
Panchmahal (18) 1,170 62 65 13 53 39 1
Dahod (19) 1,003 61 63 6 55 33 1
Vadodara (20) 1,351 85 89 11 73 24 1
Chhota Udaipur (21) 718 36 43 10 57 38 2
Bharuch (22) 831 48 55 18 55 38 0
Bardoli (23) 1,058 56 60 7 57 37 1
Surat (24) 1,324 89 90 12 77 18 2
Navsari (25) 1,611 89 90 9 71 22 1
Valsad (26) 1,110 67 66 6 59 34 1
Gujarat and UP with their respective histories of endemic and 
intermittent ethnic strife are likely to suffer from the social desira-
bility bias, with minorities voicing a socially favourable response 
to avoid disapproval. The NES elicits information on voting pref-
erences through an anonymous ballot-type method, an unobtru-
sive method which potentially decreases social desirability, but 
continues to be limited by the inability to spatially disaggregate.
Fortunately, recent e-governance and open-data initiatives 
of the Election Commission of India and advances in big data 
analytics open up methodological alternatives, in particular 
robust and spatially fi ne-grained ecological inference models. 
In this paper, we use one such model to systematically explore 
the spatial variation in Muslim vote patterns in the 2014 general 
elections in two key states: Gujarat and UP. These not only 
happen to be the states for which our own ethnographic exper-
tise is most substantial, they also provide us with the methodo-
logical advantage of varying levels of Muslim population and 
political fractionalisation. In Gujarat, with its bipolar electoral 
competition and riot-prone history, it is plausible to expect 
en bloc Muslim voting in favour of the Congress. In UP, post- 
Hindu-Muslim rioting in Muzaffarnagar in 2013, the state’s 
multiparty polity could suggest en bloc Muslim voting against 
the BJP – but the question then arises to which of the compet-
ing parties did the Muslim vote go? The principal questions we 
ask are thus: did Muslims vote more for certain parties than 
others? How did their voting preferences vary across or even 
within constituencies? And what might explain this variation?
Methodology
Our analysis is based on an original data set compiled on poll-
ing booth level, comprising 45.350 data points in Gujarat and 
138.763 data points in UP.1 Election results were tabulated from 
Form 20 submissions while religious demography was estimated 
through a linguistic algorithm that exploits the religious con-
notations of electors’ and their relatives’ names as recorded in 
the electoral rolls (Susewind, forthcoming);2 the rolls also 
provided age and gender distributions of the electorate as con-
trol variables. Based on this data set, we intend to see whether 
booths with more electors bearing Muslim-sounding names 
tend to vote more for specifi c parties.
There is one key obstacle to such ecological inference, however: 
one could normally not tell whether such a correlation occurs 
because it were indeed Muslims who vote for specifi c parties (a 
so-called compositional interpretation), since it could also be the 
case that non-Muslims consolidate their votes in the presence of 
larger numbers of Muslims (a so-called contextual interpretation; 
see Voss 2004). Much media commentary on Muslim “vote banks” 
which draws conclusions based on electoral outcomes in minority-
concentrated districts fails to distinguish these two contrary 
possibilities and thus falls into the trap of a so-called ecological 
fallacy. Similarly fl awed arguments are also used to good effect 
by political leaders to project their electoral support; the BJP, for 
example, projected a fi gure of “20-25%” Muslim vote in Gujarat’s 
2012 assembly polls (CNN-IBN, 18 August 2013) and “14-15%” in UP 
in the 2014 general elections (The Economic Times, 25 May 2014), 
presumably on the basis of their electoral successes in districts 
with strong Muslim population concentration. These successes 
could however as likely have been caused by non-Muslim vote 
consolidation in times of communal tension, as demonstrated 
after the Gujarat riots of 2002 (Dhattiwala and Biggs 2012).
Fortunately, a peculiarity of our data set allows us to work 
around the pitfalls of ecological inference by ruling out con-
textual interpretations on theoretical grounds. Contextual in-
terpretations hinge on the assumption that non-Muslims are 
exposed to a certain level of Muslim presence in their everyday 
life, which leads them to consolidate their votes. Our data set 
is however so fi ne-grained that we can limit ourselves to variation 
between multiple booths within each physical polling station,3 all 
of which serve the same rather small spatial unit. Consequently, 
electors in all these booths are exposed to the same level of Muslim 
presence in their everyday lives, even though vote pattern as well 
as booth composition differ.4 Since invariates cannot explain vari-
ation, we can safely assume that any association of intra-station 
vote pattern with intra-station variation in the number of Muslim 
electors is indeed caused by Muslims’ electoral preferences 
(i e, by compositional factors) rather than by a consolidation of 
non-Muslim votes in the presence of Muslims (i e, by contextual 
factors) – because the latter does not vary within stations.
Looking only at intra-station variation has the additional 
benefi t of implicitly controlling for a range of factors that we 
cannot include in our statistical model for lack of appropriately 
fi ne-grained data. Electors in all booths within one station are, 
for instance, subject to similar levels of campaigning, experi-
ence similar levels of infrastructural development, etc, which 
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  SEPTEMBER 27, 2014 vol xlIX no 39 101
greatly increases the robustness of our estimates. Likewise, we 
can assume that the difference in voter turnout between 
Muslim and non-Muslim electors remains stable across all 
booths within one station.5 
Our identifi cation strategy has one major drawback, however: 
it excludes polling stations with only one single booth, that is, 
31% of booths in Gujarat and 50% in UP. These also tend to 
be more rural stations, which leads to an urban bias in our 
analysis. Overall, however, 73% of all electors and 82% of all 
Muslim electors in Gujarat, and 52% of all electors and 61% of 
all Muslim electors in UP do cast their vote in stations with 
multiple booths; our analysis thus still covers a considerable part 
of the electorate (see Table 1 (p 100) and Table 4 (p 104) for a 
detailed breakdown of coverage and characteristics of multi-
booth as opposed to single-booth stations).
To estimate Muslim electoral preferences from this data set, 
we use a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) model. SURs 
estimate the impact of various coeffi cients on vote shares in sep-
arate sub-models for each party but assume shared variation in 
error terms, which makes them most suitable to the analysis of 
multiparty electoral contests (Tomz, Tucker and Wittenberg 
2012). More specifi cally, we estimate how the difference in the 
number of Muslim voters from station mean, the difference in 
percentage of female electors from station mean and the differ-
ence in average age of the electorate from station mean impact 
the difference in vote share of major parties from station mean. 
In Gujarat, we look at vote shares of the BJP, the Indian National 
Congress (INC) and – given its novelty and public visibility – the 
Aam Aadmi Party (AAP); in the case of UP, we additionally look 
at the two major regional rivals, the Bahujan Samaj 
Party (BSP) and the currently ruling Samajwadi 
Party (SP), and combine the vote shares of BJP and 
Congress with those of their respective pre-poll al-
liance partners Apna Dal (AD) and Rashtriya Lok 
Dal (RLD). To arrive at a spatially disaggregated 
picture, we run this model across each state, but 
also separately for each parliamentary constitu-
ency and each assembly segment.6
Gujarat
The Muslim vote in Gujarat was subject to unprec-
edented scrutiny in the post-2009 period. This was 
the year when the BJP, after assuming power in the 
state in 1995, began a historic rapprochement with 
the Sunni Muslims of Gujarat, providing them 
political representation in the party. Between 
2009 and 2013 (with the exception of the assembly 
elections in 2012), the BJP nominated 297 Muslim 
candidates – many Sunnis – for various local body 
elections, of which 142 (48%) won. The BJP’s 
sadbhavana campaigns to bridge the party’s 
divide with the Muslim community followed. While 
the BJP’s projection of inclusivity was conceivable in 
light of Modi’s political aspirations, it was puzzling 
to see a simultaneous surge in Muslim public sup-
port for the party. After all, barely a decade passed 
since Gujarat witnessed an anti-Muslim pogrom in 2002, 
perceived by many to have been orchestrated by the ruling BJP. 
On the whole, the Sunnis who formed the majority of Gujarat’s 
Muslim population had thus shunned electoral support to the 
BJP in the past, unlike the Shias; a BJP supporter within the 
Sunnis was perceived as a defector and support for the BJP, if at 
all, was tacit. Ethnographic interviews conducted in the weeks 
proximate to municipal, assembly and general elections in 
2010, 2012 and 2013, respectively, in Ahmedabad however re-
vealed an astonishing degree of pro-BJP sentiment; even the 
absence of co-ethnic candidates in the BJP in Gujarat’s 2012 as-
sembly elections brought little change in the pro-BJP stance of 
interviewees (Dhattiwala 2014). 
By the 2014 elections, there was thus a widespread perception 
that Muslims had electorally moved towards the BJP. Political 
statements by party leaders and prominent Muslim clerics 
(The Economic Times, 17 May 2014) on the generous Muslim 
electoral support to the BJP were, consequently, barely con-
tested. A rudimentary analysis of 101 booths in Ahmedabad for 
the 2012 assembly elections in Gujarat however challenged 
this perception (Dhattiwala 2014), as did the NES, which esti-
mated that only 8% of Gujarat’s Muslims voted for the BJP – 
not many more than the 7% of earlier general elections in 
1998, 1999 and 2004 (Sanjay Kumar, BBC News, 30 May 2014). 
Our data (Table 1), too, shows a widespread rejection of the 
BJP by Muslims: there is a considerable gap between publicly 
voiced and electorally measured support.
The fi rst three columns of Table 1 show the absolute number 
and relative share of booths as well as share of the electorate 
Table 2: Model Estimates for Gujarat
 BJP Votes by INC Votes by AAP Votes by
PC R2 Muslims Age Women  Muslims Age Women Muslims Age Women 
   Avg %  Avg %  Avg %
Whole state 0.35 -0.61 6.08 3.71 0.84 -9.28 3.36 0.01 0.29 -0.08
Kachchh (1) 0.29 -0.46 2.54 0.23 0.8 -6.86 3.98 0.02 -0.24 0.17
Banaskantha (2) 0.21 -0.44 5.14 -1.96 0.76 -7 3.94 -0.01 0.29 -0.23
Patan (3) 0.25 -0.49 6.46 -1.17 0.73 -8.91 1.08   
Mahesana (4) 0.31 -0.72 11.42 -8.47 0.83 -21.56 15.53 0 0.09 -0.05
Sabarkantha (5) 0.39 -0.35 30.29 -0.96 0.89 -23.04 3.41   
Gandhinagar (6) 0.35 -0.62 26.5 5.57 0.77 -18.04 5.35 0.03 1.12 -0.01
Ahmedabad East (7) 0.29 -0.58 24.08 3.32 0.75 -16.4 2.69 0.01 0.09 0
Ahmedabad West (8) 0.48 -0.54 23.13 2.98 0.82 -10.14 5.21 0.02 0.89 -0.14
Surendranagar (9) 0.27 -0.51 14.79 5.25 0.77 -16.08 -0.32 -0.01 0.26 0.17
Rajkot (10) 0.29 -0.57 16.22 11.3 0.78 -17.96 -0.75 0 0.65 0.19
Porbandar (11) 0.3 -0.64 31.69 5.55    0 0.14 0.05
Jamnagar (12) 0.25 -0.23 23.74 6.64 0.7 -14 -2.98 0 0.12 0.16
Junagadh (13) 0.54 -0.76 5.44 8.05 0.92 -7.77 -2.28 0.01 0.61 -0.23
Amreli (14) 0.39 -0.57 4.97 1.49 0.85 -13.73 -4.84 0 0.19 0.34
Bhavnagar (15) 0.24 -0.54 6.67 0.02 0.76 -12.32 0.72 0.03 3.76 0.14
Anand (16) 0.41 -0.48 22.72 -1.12 0.72 -26.49 3.01 0 0.14 0.05
Kheda (17) 0.4 -0.59 6.86 5.87 0.82 -9.35 2.74 0 0.08 -0.01
Panchmahal (18) 0.56 -0.44 14.04 11.83 0.83 -13.86 3.94 0 -0.29 0.16
Dahod (19) 0.32 -0.71 14.02 5.26 0.79 -9.99 1.38 0 0.14 0.2
Vadodara (20) 0.49 -0.63 14.78 4.1 0.86 -12.46 3.37 0 0.42 -0.01
Chhota Udaipur (21) 0.54 -0.59 12.15 4.81 0.89 -12.69 -1.16 0 -0.22 -0.07
Bharuch (22) 0.56 -0.86 9.95 5.58 1 -7.24 0.98 0 -0.03 0.13
Bardoli (23) 0.21 -0.52 0.93 0.52 0.73 -11.24 8.54 0 -0.19 0.04
Surat (24) 0.37 -0.8 -10.39 12.75 0.93 0.05 -0.73 0.03 -0.19 0.17
Navsari (25) 0.35 -0.68 -6.96 10.6 0.91 -3.32 1.22 0.01 0.22 -0.19
Valsad (26) 0.25 -0.64 8.28 0.51 0.82 -10.03 6.92 0.01 0.27 -0.47
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covered by multi-booth stations and thus by our analysis. The 
last four columns list the estimated share of Muslim electors and 
vote shares of major parties within those stations (see Table 1).
Specifi cally, we estimate that across all 26 constituencies 
taken together, the BJP’s vote falls by 0.61 votes with every 
additional Muslim voter in a polling booth while that of the 
Congress increases by an estimated 0.84 votes, controlling for 
age average and gender balance; there is no clear relationship 
between Muslim votes and the AAP’s vote share (Table 2, p 101). 
This fi nding remains pretty uniform if we spatially disaggre-
gate: the strongest rejection of the BJP is seen in Bharuch con-
stituency, where an additional Muslim voter in a booth is likely 
to reduce the party’s vote by 0.86 whereas the least rejection 
can be found in Jamnagar constituency where BJP vote is like-
ly to decrease by only 0.23 with every additional Muslim voter 
in a booth – still a rejection, though. 
The fi rst column of Table 2 shows the explanatory power 
(R2) of the overall SUR model, the next columns coeffi cient 
estimates for the impact of number of Muslim voters, average 
age and percentage of female electors on number of votes for 
each of the three party sub-models (see Table 2).
These estimates have to be weighed against the model’s 
explanatory power, which again varies spatially: across Gujarat, 
our model explains 35% of the intra-station variation in vote 
pattern, but this varies from 21% to 56% across parliamentary 
constituencies (with a median of 35%) and from 1% to 77% 
across assembly segments (with a median of 32%; see Table 2). 
While part of this variation in explanatory power can be attri-
buted to differences in Muslim population share (where there 
are only a few Muslim voters, even strong electoral preferences 
among them will not explain the overall outcome very well), this 
is not the whole story: the strength of “vote bank” politics 
genuinely varies across the state. Even with this qualifi cation, 
however, there is no single parliamentary constituency where 
Muslims would on average have supported the BJP. 
Could we, subsequently, infer a bloc vote against the BJP by 
Gujarat’s Muslim voters? Not quite: if we examine the spatial 
vote pattern at the level of the assembly segment, we can 
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Figure 1: Variation in Muslim Support of Major Parties in Gujarat
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Visualisation of the coefficients for Muslim support of major parties as they vary across assembly segments. The histograms show the frequency variation of these coefficients across 
assembly segments from rejection on the left to support on the right, with the bin containing the state-wide coefficient coloured in black. The maps visualise this variation spatially, with 
darker colours signifying stronger support or rejection respectively. In lined areas, our model has particularly low explanatory power (R2 below .1) while hashed areas indicate missing 
values and/or coverage so limited that the model could not run successfully. Geodata from MapMyIndia and Susewind (2014).
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Table 3: Extended Model Estimates for Gujarat
 BJP INC AAP
Age average  6.091 -9.276 0.287
Female percentage 3.732 3.339 -0.081
Number of Muslims -0.577 0.789 -0.002
– moderated by Muslim elector percentage 
 in assembly segment -0.002 0.003 0.001
– moderated by riot deaths in assembly 
 segment prior to 2002 -0.001 0.000 0.000
– moderated by riot deaths in assembly segment 
 in 2002 0.003 -0.001 0.000
Coefficient estimates for the impact of average age, percentage of female electors and 
number of Muslim voters on number of votes for each of the three party sub-models, the 
latter further moderated by Muslim elector percentage per assembly segment and number 
of riot deaths per assembly segment prior to as well as in 2002 (SUR R2 0.35).
discover some pockets where Muslims did indeed prefer the 
BJP over the Congress: in 21 of 181 (12%) assembly segments 
covered, the number of votes polled for the BJP is estimated to 
increase with every additional Muslim voter (Figure 1, p 102). 
Most of these assembly segments where Muslims did 
support the BJP are either poor urban localities (e g, parts of 
West Ahmedabad constituency) or fringe areas of the state 
bordering Rajasthan (e g, parts of Kachchh constituency) or 
Madhya Pradesh (e g, parts of Dahod constituency, sites of 
intense rioting in 2002). Moreover, the proportion of Muslim 
voters in these 21 assembly segments is lower than elsewhere 
(around 5% rather than the statewide average of 10%). It thus 
seems that Muslims are less unlikely to vote for the BJP, or 
might even on average support the party, where their propor-
tion in the electorate is particularly low, where they are more 
remote from the centre of state politics, or where they live in 
less privileged urban neighbourhoods and under higher threat 
of communal violence.
In light of wider literature on ethnic voting, this fi nding 
does not really surprise: it has been empirically demonstrated 
in a mix of contexts that the assertion of minorities vis-à-vis 
majorities varies with the proportion of each group in the 
general population (e g, Blumer 1955; Blalock 1967; Massey et al 
1999; Biggs and Knauss 2012). Where minority groups live as 
a clear numerical minority in a heterogeneous or majority-
dominant neighbourhood, they are more likely to share the 
majority group’s preferences, plausibly a consequence of the 
contact hypothesis (Allport 1954) or fear of disapproval or 
even violent retribution from the majority (Dhattiwala 2014; 
also Massey et al 1999). 
A different mechanism occurs with minorities living as 
numerically stronger or even dominant majorities in a neigh-
bourhood. They are likely to be more assertive because local-
ised majorities experience contesting intolerance, a distrust 
of the external majority, which encourages them to empha-
sise ethnic solidarity as a way to subvert the political and cul-
tural infl uence of the external majority (Massey et al 1999). 
The poorer sections of the electorate are more vulnerable to 
patron-client forms of access to state resources, where the 
citizen’s vote is directly exchanged in return for either direct 
payments or access to public goods and services, including 
physical security (e g, Stokes 2007; Berenschot 2012). This 
might explain why assembly segments with underprivileged 
Muslims, concentrated in small numbers, are less likely to 
reject the BJP than assembly segments where Muslims are 
affl uent and/or in greater numbers.
To test this hypothesis further, we constructed an extended 
statewide SUR model with additional contextual moderators 
for the extent of Muslim support to the three parties. The 
fi rst moderator is the percentage of Muslim electors in the 
assembly segment under which a given booth falls, to test 
the hypothesis that Muslims reject the BJP more if they are in 
a more robust minority position. The second and third 
moderators intend to capture an assembly segment’s history 
of Hindu-Muslim violence by counting the number of deaths 
in communal riots since independence until the mid-1990s 
(Varshney and Wilkinson 2006) as well as in 2002 (Dhattiwala 
and Biggs 2012).7
The estimates provided by this extended model explain the 
observed spatial variation in Muslim vote pattern only margin-
ally better than our original model, but they still differentiate 
our analysis and indicate avenues for further research (Table 3). 
First, they confi rm that the rejection of the BJP by Muslims and 
their preference for the Congress indeed grows stronger in 
areas with higher Muslim percentage in the electorate. Second, 
a long history of communal violence tends to slightly decrease 
Muslim support for the BJP in the 2014  elections – but communal 
violence in 2002 paradoxically had the opposite effect. This is 
counter-intuitive and departs from ethnographic evidence 
collected from riot-affected neighbourhoods of Ahmedabad, 
where many Muslims publicly expressed a deep antagonism 
towards Modi and the BJP. Yet further enquiry reveals that 
places particularly affected in 2012 were also places where 
Muslims were in a smaller minority. Again, subordinated 
groups when in too small a minority are less likely to be able to 
shape their own group interests and, subsequently, are more 
vulnerable to social approval – so that the experience of direct 
violence does not necessarily translate into reduced voting for 
the BJP. It is possible that the present anxiety of daily living 
outweighs the effect of past trauma – or that the anxiety of 
future violence triggers a security mechanism of allying with 
the government that the voters view as their perpetrators. 
Either way, this is a good illustration of interview evidence not 
matching behavioural evidence, providing ample reason to 
complement the former with the latter.
In sum, the example of Gujarat demonstrates three impor-
tant points. First, while the relevance of Muslims’ electoral 
choices as well as the strength of “vote bank” politics and 
thus the explanatory power of our model varies spatially, we 
see an almost uniform rejection of the BJP and strong support 
of the Congress by Muslims across the state. This indicates that 
the much publicised Muslim support of the BJP in the media and, 
to an extent, in pre-poll surveys, did not translate into strong 
support at the ballot box. Second, however, the broad spatial 
uniformity cracks when one disaggregates further to the level of 
assembly segments, indicating that “vote bank” politics operate 
even below the level of parliamentary constituencies – and 
that Muslim rejection of the BJP is weaker or even reverses 
into support in areas with a very limited Muslim presence, 
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which also tend to be underprivileged areas, subject to higher 
levels of communal violence, or in remote fringes of the state.
Uttar Pradesh
With 80 parliamentary constituencies and a Muslim popula-
tion share of 18%, UP is often seen as the classic blackboard of 
electoral arithmetic. Unlike bipolar competition in Gujarat, 
political fractionalisation in UP and the advent of coalition 
politics in the centre – in which regional parties from UP play a 
considerable role – provides more complex choices for Mus-
lims (Rehman 2013). From voting for the Congress until the 
1990s, Muslim electors veered towards regional parties, fi rst 
to the SP in the aftermath of the Babri Masjid demolition in 
1992 and later, following the SP-BJP alliance in 2009, to the 
BSP. Moreover, much of this changing vote preference was said 
to be borne of the Muslim voter’s suspicion of the BJP’s at-
tempts at arousing communal tensions (Verniers 2014). Many 
commentators also attributed SP’s overwhelming victory in 
the 2012 assembly elections to a return of the Muslim vote, 
even though post-poll surveys once more could not confi rm 
this (CSDS 2012). Multiparty politics clearly meant that Muslims 
had the choice to move across parties, even if they eventually 
voted en bloc against the BJP. 
The elections in 2014 were particularly crucial for the 
revival of the BJP as a national party, and its biggest challenge 
was to consolidate non-Muslim votes in UP, a state where 
Muslim electors were likely to vote for rival parties. In June 
2013, the BJP thus began its makeover in UP under the leader-
ship of Amit Shah, former home minister of Gujarat, formally 
accused of ordering extrajudicial killings of Muslims in Gujarat. 
Table 4: Characteristics of Multi-Booth Stations in Uttar Pradesh
 Coverage of  Demography and Votes in
 Multi-Booth Stations Multi-Booth Stations
PC N Booths Electors Muslims BJP-AD INC-RLD BSP SP AAP
  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Whole state 69,535 50 52 22 45 10 18 21 1
Saharanpur (1) 834 53 54 39 38 40 15 5 0
Kairana (2) 724 48 50 36 48 3 12 34 0
Muzaffarnagar (3) 874 57 62 33 54 1 26 17 0
Bijnor (4) 873 56 60 35 42 2 19 33 0
Nagina (5) 864 56 60 42 34 0 23 37 0
Moradabad (6) 1,151 68 71 41 40 2 13 39 0
Rampur (7) 716 50 54 46 32 20 7 40 0
Sambhal (8) 1,009 60 61 42 31 2 24 38 0
Amroha (9) 1,184 76 76 33 45 1 15 37 0
Meerut (10) 1,423 86 86 26 48 4 27 19 1
Baghpat (11) 808 55 54 24 43 18 13 23 1
Ghaziabad (12) 2,017 93 94 18 57 15 12 7 7
Gautam Budh 
Nagar (13) 1378 73 76 17 52 1 15 25 3
Bulandshahr (14) 1,107 65 64 21 58 7 17 14 1
Aligarh (15) 1,038 59 63 24 47 6 18 26 1
Hathras (16) 708 37 41 14 53 6 21 18 1
Mathura (17) 986 57 62 10 60 19 14 3 1
Agra (18) 1,432 77 79 13 56 4 28 8 1
Fatehpur Sikri (19) 915 52 56 7 47 3 26 19 0
Firozabad (20) 951 52 54 14 41 1 11 45 0
Mainpuri (21) 445 23 26 11 27 0 14 55 1
Etah (22) 620 37 42 17 51 0 16 29 0
Badaun (23) 857 47 51 25 35 0 15 46 0
Aonla (24) 687 39 42 26 40 14 17 27 0
Bareilly (25) 899 55 52 31 49 10 8 29 0
Pilibhit (26) 828 47 50 28 47 3 20 26 1
Shahjahanpur (27) 662 30 32 21 47 3 23 22 0
Kheri (28) 1,147 69 70 23 38 19 24 14 0
Dhaurahra (29) 613 40 43 24 35 18 20 22 0
Sitapur (30) 664 42 43 30 39 3 38 16 0
Hardoi (31) 781 44 46 17 37 3 28 29 0
Misrikh (32) 668 36 37 18 43 3 31 19 0
Unnao (33) 543 25 27 15 47 18 15 14 0
Mohanlalganj (34) 803 43 45 21 42 5 25 24 1
Lucknow (35) 1,601 99 99 23 55 27 6 5 4
Raebareli (36) 912 55 59 14 21 65 7 0 1
Amethi (37) 947 59 61 22 33 48 6 0 3
Sultanpur (38) 471 31 31 12 41 5 27 21 1
Pratapgarh (39) 787 52 54 16 42 16 23 13 1
 Coverage of  Demography and Votes in
 Multi-Booth Stations Multi-Booth Stations
PC N Booths Electors Muslims BJP-AD INC-RLD BSP SP AAP
  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Farrukhabad (40) 762 44 47 19 45 16 12 17 0
Etawah (41) 457 30 34 13 50 1 17 28 1
Kannauj (42) 318 17 21 17 46 0 12 39 0
Kanpur (43) 1,425 96 96 21 57 30 6 3 1
Akbarpur (44) 1,032 63 66 11 56 10 18 12 1
Jalaun (45) 1,016 46 47 14 51 8 23 15 0
Jhansi (46) 866 44 48 12 49 9 14 23 1
Hamirpur (47) 1,039 58 62 14 48 9 17 17 1
Banda (48) 774 47 49 13 44 5 25 19 1
Fatehpur (49) 981 52 55 19 45 5 30 16 0
Kaushambi (50) 481 28 29 17 35 4 17 39 0
Phulpur (51) 907 52 55 19 55 9 14 19 1
Allahabad (52) 611 40 45 20 41 13 14 27 1
Barabanki (53) 643 35 36 25 40 28 14 13 0
Faizabad (54) 540 31 31 22 46 15 14 20 0
Ambedkar Nagar (55) 284 17 17 20 42 2 25 25 0
Bahraich (56) 1,127 74 71 31 45 3 9 38 1
Kaiserganj (57) 1,067 63 62 23 39 6 15 34 0
Shrawasti (58) 689 40 40 28 36 2 17 31 0
Gonda (59) 843 51 52 26 40 12 13 22 0
Domariyaganj (60) 702 37 39 32 33 8 19 18 0
Basti (61) 565 30 31 19 38 3 23 30 1
Sant Kabir Nagar (62) 609 29 30 23 34 2 23 23 1
Maharajganj (63) 779 47 46 18 46 6 21 19 0
Gorakhpur (64) 1,342 70 72 15 53 4 16 22 1
Kushi Nagar (65) 1,093 66 66 19 39 31 13 11 0
Deoria (66) 1,008 57 58 18 52 4 24 14 1
Bansgaon (67) 695 38 39 11 51 5 24 15 1
Lalganj (68) 863 53 54 18 37 2 25 28 1
Azamgarh (69) 1,006 60 61 20 30 2 28 34 0
Ghosi (70) 654 36 34 24 36 2 20 15 0
Salempur (71) 521 31 37 16 50 6 16 18 0
Ballia (72) 635 36 39 15 40 2 15 19 0
Jaunpur (73) 802 44 44 17 39 5 21 17 5
Machhlishahr (74) 796 43 46 14 46 4 24 19 1
Ghazipur (75) 916 54 55 15 32 2 24 26 1
Chandauli (76) 1,039 66 66 15 44 3 26 20 2
Varanasi (77) 1,397 87 87 20 57 7 5 4 21
Bhadohi (78) 875 50 51 14 41 3 25 25 0
Mirzapur (79) 861 50 49 14 46 16 20 10 0
Robertsganj (80) 588 35 38 14 48 10 18 13 2
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In August, two months after the BJP’s aggressive campaigning in 
UP under Shah, Muzaffarnagar district in western UP witnessed 
Hindu-Muslim riots that claimed at least 60 lives. Ostensibly, 
these were politically orchestrated to cleave the region’s historic 
Jat-Muslim alliance; the BJP was understood to be the biggest 
potential benefi ciary of a consolidated Jat vote, which in previ-
ous elections was dispersed across the BJP, SP and RLD (Tehelka, 
8 September 2013; Live Mint, 10 April 2014).8 The ethnocentric 
momentum continued: the BJP in UP nominated three candidates 
offi cially accused of inciting the Muzaffarnagar riots; talks of 
the Ayodhya temple campaign were revived; cases against the 
Jats accused were promised to be withdrawn; and Jat voters 
were urged to take “revenge” for the Muzaffarnagar riots, by 
voting in favour of the BJP – a strategy reminiscent of Modi’s 
hate speeches on the eve of the Gujarat polls in 2002. 
The fi rst three columns of Table 4 (p 104) show the absolute 
number and relative share of booths as well as share of the 
electorate covered by multi-booth stations and thus by our 
analysis. The last six columns list the estimated share of 
Muslim electors and vote shares of major parties within those 
stations (see Table 4).
Whereas Muslims were consequently expected to shun the 
BJP at least in western UP as well as the ruling SP for their failure 
to ensure security during the violence, some commentators 
believed that the agenda of economic development that, 
purportedly, veered Muslims towards the BJP in Gujarat would 
also work for Muslims in the rest of UP. So when the BJP made 
headlines with its unprecedented victory at the ballot, winning 
71 of 80 seats in UP, some quickly concluded that Muslims 
must have overwhelmingly voted for the BJP. This included 
prominent Shia and Sunni Muslim clerics of UP who called the 
BJP victory a consequence of the “disenchantment” of Muslims 
with secular parties like the Congress (The Economic Times, 
17 May 2014) and SP leader Azam Khan to whom “(Muslims) 
were trapped into believing false promises (of the) BJP” (India 
 Today, 19 May 2014). Once more, the NES did not confi rm such 
claims, though, and estimated at best a “marginal shift” in the 
Muslim voter towards the BJP on a statewide level (Sanjay 
 Kumar, BBC News, 30 May 2014).
While our analysis supports this general contention, our 
ability to disaggregate really turns into a methodological 
advantage in UP. Given the state’s larger geographical size 
and its nature of political contestation with four rather than 
two major parties in the fray (Table 4), the Muslim vote indeed 
shows considerable spatial variation: Muslims do have dis-
cernable preferences in most constituencies, but these do not 
add up to a clear statewide picture. Consequently, our model 
only explains 13% of the intra-station variation in vote pattern 
across the whole state, but its explanatory power rises with 
each step of spatial disaggregation: on constituency level, it 
explains up to 43% of the variation (with a median of 17%), and in 
some assembly segments even up to 76% of the variation (with 
a median of 20%; see Table 5, pp 107-08). Again, part of this 
variation in explanatory power can be attributed to differences 
in Muslim population share; the model is strongest in western 
and northern UP, where Muslims are more numerous and 
“vote bank” politics more entrenched, but weaker in the south 
and east of the state.
Across the state, the BJP’s vote falls by an estimated 0.28 
votes with every additional Muslim voter in a polling booth, 
controlling for age average and gender balance – but this fi gure 
varies from an estimated loss of 0.65 votes in constituencies 
such as Muzaffarnagar to a gain of 0.54 votes in Robertsganj: 
Muslims in the north-west rejected the BJP most consistently, 
while one can fi nd pockets of BJP support in the rest of the 
state. Compared to Gujarat, Muslims’ rejection of the BJP is 
also less pronounced, though actual support remains rare, and 
only forms a trend in 15 constituencies (19%). Again, we also 
found considerable variation within constituencies: Muslim 
electoral preferences are a highly localised affair, in UP as 
much as in Gujarat (Figure 2, p 106).
While Muslims’ rejection of the BJP has cracks in UP’s east, 
there is no single constituency or assembly segment where 
Muslims rejected the Congress or SP, even though the degree of 
support varies. Across the state, SP scores an estimated 0.65 
votes for each additional Muslim voter in a polling booth, while 
Congress wins an estimated 0.27 votes. As Figure 2 shows, 
Muslim support for the latter is also fairly concentrated in 
Awadh (including the cities of Lucknow and Kanpur as well as 
the Gandhi family’s home turf in Raebareli and Amethi) and a few 
additional constituencies, often those in which senior leaders 
stood for election (Saharanpur, Mathura, Farrukhabad, Kheri, 
Mirzapur and Khushinagar). In contrast, the SP managed to win 
more uniform Muslim support, though it fared strongest in 
western UP, and lost to Congress in the places just mentioned. 
The other major regional party, the BSP, has more scattered sup-
port among Muslims with an estimated statewide gain of 0.10 
votes for each additional Muslim voter, with strong support only 
in Sitapur, Pratapgarh and, interestingly, Etawah, the strong-
hold of SP and its leader Mulayam Singh Yadav.
AAP fi nally has rather limited support among Muslims, 
with one important exception: in Varanasi, the AAP contender 
to Modi and party convenor, Arvind Kejriwal, drew consider-
able Muslim support, with an estimated gain of 0.97 votes for 
each additional Muslim voter (Table 5). Indeed, the strong 
rejection of Modi and the BJP by Muslims in Varanasi (an 
estimated loss of 0.49 votes for each additional Muslim voter) 
led almost exclusively to support for AAP, while SP, BSP and 
Congress fared much less well.
The fi rst column of Table 5 shows the explanatory power 
(R2) of the overall SUR model, the next columns coeffi cient es-
timates for the impact of number of Muslim voters, average 
age and percentage of female electors on number of votes for 
each of the fi ve party sub-models (see Table 5).
How can this complex pattern of Muslim electoral pre-
ferences in UP be understood? Besides reiterating that bloc 
voting happens on a very local level given the fractured nature 
of presumably uniform “vote banks”, we again developed an 
extended SUR model to test three overarching hypotheses: the 
moderating impact of relative population share on the forma-
tion of electoral preferences (as argued in the case of Gujarat), 
the moderating impact of communal violence, and fi nally the 
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Figure 2: Variation in Muslim Support of Major Parties in Uttar Pradesh
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Visualisation of the coefficients for Muslim support of major parties as they vary across assembly segments. The histograms show the frequency variation of these coefficients across 
assembly segments from rejection on the left to support on the right, with the bin containing the statewide coefficient coloured in black. The maps visualise this variation spatially, with 
darker colours signifying stronger support or rejection respectively. In lined areas, our model has particularly low explanatory power (R2 below .1) while hashed areas indicate missing 
values and/or coverage so limited that the model could not run successfully. Geodata from MapMyIndia and Susewind (2014).
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Table 5: Model Estimates for Uttar Pradesh
 BJP-AD Votes by INC-RLD Votes by BSP Votes by SP Votes by AAP Votes by
PC R2 Muslims Age  Women % Muslims Age  Women % Muslims Age  Women % Muslims Age  Women % Muslims Age  Women %
   Average   Average   Average   Average   Average
Whole state 0.13 -0.28 4.04 3.22 0.27 -0.04 0.08 0.10 -0.87 0.14 0.65 0.51 -0.40 0.04 0.01 -0.16
Saharanpur (1) 0.39 -0.17 11.79 13.95 1.10 -2.69 -0.36 -0.24 -4.65 -8.97 0.12 -0.10 3.01 0.00 0.06 0.12
Kairana (2) 0.43 -0.43 7.90 12.79 0.00 0.86 1.26 0.05 -0.63 -3.72 1.07 -1.92 -4.97 0.00 0.03 0.03
Muzaffarnagar (3) 0.28 -0.56 6.66 15.48 0.00 0.60 0.26 0.51 -8.60 -8.92 0.54 -1.43 0.21 0.00 -0.11 0.17
Bijnor (4) 0.42 -0.46 15.32 14.04 0.00 1.23 1.24 -0.01 -4.04 3.05 1.10 -3.16 -3.31 0.00 0.08 0.08
Nagina (5) 0.32 -0.32 14.02 12.04    -0.08 -5.83 -9.27 0.89 -2.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.15
Moradabad (6) 0.40 -0.36 7.58 8.10 0.03 -0.06 0.20 0.00 -1.26 0.12 0.97 -1.69 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.08
Rampur (7) 0.36 -0.44 -0.30 -1.00 0.37 -0.57 -0.11 -0.07 0.60 -1.34 0.77 -2.68 1.72 0.00 0.02 0.03
Sambhal (8) 0.33 -0.30 5.08 -0.69 0.01 0.11 -0.13 0.07 -0.77 -1.39 0.95 -5.11 2.91   
Amroha (9) 0.41 -0.44 8.45 1.07 0.00 0.55 0.16 0.03 -2.53 -1.23 1.16 -5.39 -1.11 0.00 -0.01 0.07
Meerut (10) 0.16 -0.21 12.32 13.09 0.02 0.98 1.05 0.30 -6.78 -6.91 0.71 -1.17 2.23 0.00 0.73 0.25
Baghpat (11) 0.36 -0.25 10.90 4.38 0.00 12.28 3.70 -0.15 -10.77 -6.93 1.18 0.36 1.15 0.00 0.33 0.10
Ghaziabad (12) 0.14 -0.23 8.88 8.23 0.66 0.34 -1.04 0.03 -2.20 0.08 0.33 0.73 0.15 0.11 -0.09 0.88
Gautam Budh Nagar (13) 0.19 -0.30 5.37 1.17 0.00 0.05 -0.09 0.05 0.16 -0.18 1.01 6.01 -1.22 0.02 0.25 0.52
Bulandshahr (14) 0.16 -0.44 18.11 5.81 0.30 2.02 0.71 -0.13 -13.68 -9.13 0.75 -2.34 -2.33 0.01 0.35 0.35
Aligarh (15) 0.24 -0.29 7.84 3.83 0.04 0.82 -0.11 -0.12 -5.33 -1.80 0.97 -4.28 -4.96 0.01 0.05 0.04
Hathras (16) 0.12 -0.15 9.36 8.34 0.01 0.74 -0.27 0.03 -7.26 0.18 1.04 1.44 -1.95 0.01 -0.03 -0.06
Mathura (17) 0.12 -0.46 -0.29 7.52 1.11 2.83 -0.93 -0.05 -6.75 3.55 0.18 0.43 0.04 0.00 0.33 0.45
Agra (18) 0.07 -0.23 3.25 6.45 0.07 0.53 0.63 0.59 -2.93 -1.53 0.32 0.53 0.24 0.00 0.14 0.22
Fatehpur Sikri (19) 0.05 -0.16 4.11 -0.22 0.00 0.89 -0.55 0.19 1.47 -0.76 0.92 2.88 0.33 0.01 0.03 0.08
Firozabad (20) 0.20 -0.44 5.04 0.31 0.01 0.08 0.10 -0.08 -1.08 1.54 1.03 -2.80 1.36 0.00 0.07 -0.01
Mainpuri (21) 0.18 -0.20 2.10 4.44    -0.06 1.12 0.60 0.72 4.11 3.24 0.00 -0.09 -0.02
Etah (22) 0.20 -0.46 8.18 0.18    0.20 -2.95 -3.59 0.95 -2.58 -1.42 0.00 0.06 -0.02
Badaun (23) 0.27 -0.29 1.08 -2.10    0.04 -0.29 -1.64 0.95 -2.50 -2.89 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Aonla (24) 0.20 -0.30 2.73 4.37 0.51 -0.50 -1.76 -0.11 -1.49 3.19 0.63 -1.35 -1.97 0.00 -0.01 0.12
Bareilly (25) 0.41 -0.59 3.52 5.14 0.16 0.94 -0.41 0.05 0.13 0.17 1.02 -1.77 1.19 0.00 0.09 0.06
Pilibhit (26) 0.31 -0.45 7.21 1.52 0.01 0.58 0.34 0.31 0.50 0.83 0.84 -0.55 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.12
Shahjahanpur (27) 0.17 -0.22 6.78 3.14 0.02 0.36 0.02 0.40 1.19 -1.50 0.75 1.33 0.39 0.01 0.01 0.08
Kheri (28) 0.27 -0.29 0.83 5.89 0.91 1.64 -0.17 -0.06 0.15 1.92 0.13 0.99 -1.34 0.00 0.05 0.02
Dhaurahra (29) 0.17 -0.40 1.20 5.42 0.40 2.09 -0.04 0.10 0.60 -1.28 0.44 2.59 -1.15   
Sitapur (30) 0.34 -0.29 -0.92 6.12 0.01 -0.65 0.06 0.81 -2.98 -4.45 0.28 1.58 -1.31 0.00 0.01 0.01
Hardoi (31) 0.14 -0.19 6.23 2.24 0.10 0.18 -0.18 0.45 0.43 -0.36 0.66 4.03 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.01
Misrikh (32) 0.14 0.15 3.89 1.01 0.07 0.39 0.59 0.50 0.62 -2.61 0.60 3.07 -0.58   
Unnao (33) 0.15 -0.23 6.84 -4.45 0.78 0.59 -0.48 0.18 -1.96 -1.13 0.35 2.30 -2.59 0.00 0.05 -0.26
Mohanlalganj (34) 0.09 0.05 3.16 -0.71 0.13 -0.15 0.27 0.36 4.44 6.02 0.48 5.09 0.78 0.01 -0.12 0.02
Lucknow (35) 0.25 -0.21 5.53 5.90 0.98 0.06 -1.85 0.04 -1.06 -0.54 0.09 -0.19 -0.81 0.07 0.75 1.33
Raebareli (36) 0.24 0.09 -0.71 4.87 1.20 -1.76 0.49 0.03 -0.40 0.78    0.00 -0.01 -0.06
Amethi (37) 0.42 -0.11 0.35 1.18 1.09 -1.83 2.99 0.01 -0.44 2.08    0.02 -0.09 0.41
Sultanpur (38) 0.18 0.11 -0.94 8.61 0.03 0.85 -0.60 0.07 1.00 7.36 1.45 -1.92 -4.21 0.01 0.03 0.34
Pratapgarh (39) 0.12 -0.06 1.07 -4.25 0.24 -3.30 -1.22 0.82 -2.66 4.48 0.11 -2.18 -0.19 0.01 -0.19 -0.02
Farrukhabad (40) 0.27 -0.42 1.57 5.05 1.01 -1.01 -0.63 0.00 -0.92 0.02 0.12 -0.06 -1.09 0.01 0.00 0.13
Etawah (41) 0.17 -0.31 3.37 19.75 0.05 0.08 0.37 0.15 -1.78 -1.03 1.03 -0.71 -4.32 0.01 0.04 0.02
Kannauj (42) 0.18 -0.16 5.87 5.88    -0.02 -0.87 3.48 0.98 7.64 -5.40 0.00 -0.05 -0.11
Kanpur (43) 0.34 -0.26 6.97 7.22 1.04 0.69 -0.90 0.01 -1.56 -1.64 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.25 0.29
Akbarpur (44) 0.07 -0.14 8.37 3.10 0.58 2.56 -1.99 0.12 -1.04 -3.16 0.28 1.05 -1.35 0.01 0.31 0.29
Jalaun (45) 0.09 0.41 5.41 2.90 0.39 -0.27 0.77 0.42 -3.82 0.49 0.47 -0.06 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.09
Jhansi (46) 0.15 -0.42 4.05 -6.04 0.31 3.87 2.06 -0.03 -4.88 -0.30 0.80 1.74 -0.59 0.00 0.05 -0.11
Hamirpur (47) 0.10 -0.24 9.99 -0.16 0.39 1.49 -0.09 0.03 -1.15 -0.50 0.57 -2.90 1.78 0.00 -0.44 0.15
Banda (48) 0.08 0.19 5.49 -15.52 0.12 0.92 -1.19 0.49 -0.91 6.23 0.58 1.42 2.21 0.01 0.19 -0.17
Fatehpur (49) 0.16 -0.22 4.77 -2.58 0.00 0.42 -0.57 0.61 -2.42 3.27 0.48 2.38 -3.35 0.00 0.05 -0.08
Kaushambi (50) 0.11 -0.18 5.74 -5.40 0.14 0.31 -0.01 0.24 1.30 3.68 0.68 1.23 -2.59 0.01 0.02 0.00
Phulpur (51) 0.11 -0.09 5.35 -3.43 0.33 0.56 0.69 0.05 0.68 1.48 0.77 1.15 -3.22 0.01 0.15 0.20
Allahabad (52) 0.21 -0.28 1.27 -2.20 0.18 0.84 0.64 0.03 0.14 -0.07 0.83 4.47 -0.59 0.01 0.01 -0.12
Barabanki (53) 0.24 -0.16 8.37 5.71 0.91 0.22 0.76 0.03 -0.09 5.20 0.20 1.38 -2.20 0.00 0.17 0.00
Faizabad (54) 0.16 -0.09 3.35 -0.66 0.56 0.75 -0.82 -0.01 1.51 0.67 0.41 1.81 0.56 0.01 0.12 0.03
Ambedkar Nagar (55) 0.20 -0.04 5.17 -5.72 0.04 0.59 0.49 0.26 3.41 4.58 0.94 2.89 3.43 0.01 0.19 -0.07
Bahraich (56) 0.43 -0.32 6.19 6.70 0.01 0.33 0.10 0.02 0.81 0.87 1.13 -0.42 -1.42 0.00 0.17 0.04
Continued
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Table 5: Model Estimates for Uttar Pradesh (Continued)
 BJP-AD Votes by INC-RLD Votes by BSP Votes by SP Votes by AAP Votes by
PC R2 Muslims Age  Women % Muslims Age  Women % Muslims Age  Women % Muslims Age  Women % Muslims Age  Women %
   Average   Average   Average   Average   Average
Kaiserganj (57) 0.25 -0.11 3.10 5.06 0.05 0.10 -0.27 0.04 1.32 2.36 0.89 -0.79 -2.41 0.00 0.07 -0.07
Shrawasti (58) 0.28 -0.20 0.70 -2.82 0.01 0.11 0.04 -0.08 0.92 0.96 0.92 -3.21 1.44 0.00 0.03 0.02
Domariyaganj (60) 0.06 -0.15 5.35 1.80 0.06 1.21 0.46 0.21 1.84 2.06 0.27 -0.32 1.54 0.00 0.09 0.07
Basti (61) 0.25 -0.18 6.84 5.17 0.03 0.49 0.04 0.06 3.68 3.19 0.94 2.25 -1.78 0.00 0.36 0.17
Sant Kabir Nagar (62) 0.06 -0.02 -0.73 -2.58 0.02 -0.08 0.19 0.13 -0.06 -1.49 0.46 -0.17 -2.33 0.02 0.01 -0.05
Maharajganj (63) 0.17 -0.18 0.96 -2.55 0.12 1.12 -0.67 0.07 2.36 7.50 0.81 -2.68 -1.15 0.00 -0.02 0.04
Gorakhpur (64) 0.17 -0.18 1.11 1.44 0.09 0.11 0.49 0.03 -2.18 0.85 0.97 1.30 -0.17 0.03 0.08 0.19
Kushi Nagar (65) 0.18 0.06 3.30 0.62 0.83 0.80 -0.05 0.02 0.16 1.89 0.20 1.41 0.88 0.00 0.08 0.04
Deoria (66) 0.13 -0.10 3.26 6.32 0.05 0.01 0.69 0.80 -2.25 2.74 0.27 0.63 -0.94 0.01 0.10 0.08
Bansgaon (67) 0.05 0.31 8.34 0.86 0.21 0.26 0.17 0.36 -4.99 -2.59 0.35 2.64 0.28 0.01 -0.11 0.10
Lalganj (68) 0.13 -0.19 -0.59 -6.05 0.02 -0.05 0.20 -0.14 -5.24 15.16 0.76 -1.08 0.34 0.01 0.11 0.25
Azamgarh (69) 0.10 -0.16 2.83 -1.11 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.30 -3.30 3.59 0.57 -0.53 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00
Ghosi (70) 0.05 -0.05 3.42 -2.03 0.01 0.10 0.08 -0.04 3.48 0.75 0.17 1.37 4.09 0.00 0.05 0.07
Salempur (71) 0.05 0.08 4.05 -5.67 0.26 0.78 -0.55 0.13 1.84 1.11 0.34 0.25 4.83 0.00 0.01 0.03
Ballia (72) 0.00 -0.01 -0.65 -1.08 0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.01 -1.59 1.28 0.12 1.86 0.33 0.00 -0.05 -0.06
Jaunpur (73) 0.07 0.20 6.73 -0.12 0.30 0.66 0.77 0.24 -2.49 7.97 0.42 3.10 -0.82 0.10 2.80 0.10
Machhlishahr (74) 0.07 0.19 10.69 -3.01 0.10 0.60 -0.47 0.42 -1.86 2.15 0.55 1.27 0.60 0.01 0.27 0.05
Ghazipur (75) 0.02 0.15 0.98 -7.17 0.05 -0.10 0.22 0.07 -3.95 3.84 0.36 0.51 -4.00 0.01 0.00 -0.30
Chandauli (76) 0.06 0.05 12.91 1.83 0.13 0.77 -0.68 0.42 -3.32 3.22 0.42 0.20 -1.79 0.09 -0.16 0.09
Varanasi (77) 0.29 -0.49 1.58 5.96 0.15 1.12 -0.17 0.01 -0.48 0.44 0.02 0.69 -0.38 0.97 1.23 -2.41
Bhadohi (78) 0.11 0.01 2.79 4.92 0.13 0.83 -0.91 0.24 -0.27 8.83 0.78 3.80 -0.06   
Mirzapur (79) 0.12 -0.19 -5.10 2.18 0.93 0.87 0.41 0.06 -5.43 0.37 0.17 -1.10 -1.74 0.01 -0.04 0.04
Robertsganj (80) 0.07 0.54 -1.88 0.01 0.31 0.78 2.57 0.36 -0.86 1.88 0.58 1.28 0.56 0.04 0.18 0.02
Table 6: Extended Model Estimates for Uttar Pradesh
 BJP-AD INC-RLD BSP SP AAP
Age average  4.203 -0.037 -0.779 0.332 0.027
Female percentage 3.161 0.071 0.096 -0.336 -0.174
Number of Muslims -0.016 0.385 0.243 0.477 0.080
– moderated by Muslim elector 
 percentage in assembly segment -0.009 -0.005 -0.008 0.002 -0.001
– moderated by riot deaths 
 in assembly segment  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
– moderated by communal incidents
  in district -0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
– moderated by Muslim candidate  0.312 0.195 0.361 -0.005
Coefficient estimates for the impact of average age, percentage of female electors and 
number of Muslim voters on number of votes for each of the five party sub-models, the 
latter further moderated by Muslim elector percentage per assembly segment, number 
of riot deaths per assembly segment (until mid-1990s), communal incidents per district 
(2014 post-elections), and the fact that a party’s candidate was Muslim ( SUR R2 0.15).
role of ethnic coordination, that is the preference of Muslims 
for a certain party if that party nominates a Muslim candidate 
(a factor which played no role in Gujarat, but might be more 
relevant in UP).9 This extended model follows the same basic 
logic as in the case of Gujarat, but supplemented the number 
of deaths in communal riots since independence until the 
mid-1990s (Varshney and Wilkinson 2006) with a district-
wise number of communal incidents recorded by the police in 
the 10 weeks after the 2014 elections (The Indian Express, 
9 August 2014) to have at least some crude measure for the 
recent communalisation trend.10 As was the case in Gujarat, 
the rise in explanatory power thanks to these additional mod-
erators remains modest (R2 rises only to 15%; see Table 6), so 
that the following discussion is best understood as a road map 
for future research. 
As in Gujarat, a higher Muslim share in the electorate in UP 
tends to swing the Muslim vote away from the BJP, but also 
from Congress, AAP, and especially BSP – and towards the SP. 
Whether this truly explains – or merely masks for – the 
diverging vote pattern in western and eastern UP has to be 
seen in more thorough studies, though – one competing 
explanation for the west-east-divide would be the impact of 
entrenched communal politics, in particular after the BJP 
attempted to rake up the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots (Pai 2014). 
Indeed, Muzaffarnagar itself saw among the strongest 
anti-BJP vote among Muslims (Table 5), but while most of the 
Muslim vote in western UP went to SP, Muzaffarnagar itself 
and especially Muzaffarnagar town went to the BSP. This was 
perhaps an outcome of the fact that both the BJP and the BSP 
nominated riot-accused candidates (Sanjeev Baliyan and 
Kadir Rana, respectively), creating a strategic clash of candi-
dates and pitting divisive issues of one group against another, 
a competition in which the SP candidate was left behind. 
Another explanation is suggested by our next two moderating 
factors: while the BSP is the only party that won Muslim 
support in areas where the more recent attempts at commu-
nalisation culminated, the only party that really lost Muslim 
support in areas with a long history of violent communalism 
was the ruling SP, suggesting that Muslims expect the state to 
guarantee their safety – and thus punish the ruling party if it 
fails to deliver. 
The rejection of certain parties does not explain support for 
others, though – unlike under conditions of a two-party contest 
in Gujarat, Muslims did have a choice in UP. Our extended model 
shows that this choice is strongly affected by ethnic coordina-
tion, that is, the tendency of Muslims to vote for a certain party 
if and where it nominated a Muslim candidate. This effect is 
particularly pronounced in the case of Congress and the SP, which 
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obtained almost double as strong a Muslim support if they nom-
inated a Muslim candidate – another pattern which warrants 
closer examination, as the effect of ethnic coordination was 
much less visible for the BSP, and almost indiscernible in the 
case of AAP. The BJP did not nominate Muslim candidates at all.
In sum, our analysis of the spatial pattern of Muslim votes in UP 
complements and qualifi es our fi ndings from Gujarat in three 
ways. First, we see an even higher variation in both the relative 
relevance of “vote bank” politics (more to the west than the east) 
and in substantial party preferences of Muslims, underlining 
the importance of disaggregated analyses. Second, the BJP was 
largely rejected by Muslims in UP as well, though not as clearly 
as in Gujarat. Finally, this could partly refl ect the fact that 
Muslims not only reject the BJP but also the ruling party, in 
cases where the same does not properly guarantee their safety. 
In Gujarat, some Muslims might have reversed both trends 
because of their strongly marginalised and threatened position 
in certain assembly segments – but in UP, they have realistic 
electoral alternatives, and seem to make good use of them.
Conclusions 
The 16th Lok Sabha elections fl agged the question of the 
Muslim vote more emphatically than ever before, primarily 
because of the political elevation of BJP leader Narendra Modi 
as the prime minister. The assumption that Muslims of India 
col lectively vote as a bloc for a given party or candidate became 
pertinent in light of the Hindu-Muslim violence in  Gujarat in 
2002, during Modi’s rule, and in Muzaffarnagar in UP in 2013. 
Did Muslims consequently vote en bloc against the BJP in 2014, 
too – and if so, which alternative did they prefer? 
Election commentators and political pundits usually answer 
such questions by dissecting vote pattern in minority-concen-
trated districts. This is likely to produce spurious inferences, 
owing to the ecological fallacy. Scientifi c surveys in contrast 
provide better measures and generally refute “vote bank” 
hypotheses, but remain restricted by their inability to spatially 
disaggregate data. But what if all politics are local? To circum-
vent ecological fallacies and complement survey research with 
a more disaggregated perspective, we proposed a methodo-
logical alternative: a fi ne-grained ecological inference model 
run on intra-station variation in vote shares and Muslim 
demography, estimated from electors’ names. Based on this 
alternative methodology, we make two main arguments: 
fi rstly, Muslim support for the BJP as reported in public is to 
be distinguished from electoral support. Second, there is no 
overarching statewide Muslim vote. Rather, Muslim voting 
preferences are more localised and spatially variable across 
and within constituencies.
The former argument is best illustrated in Gujarat, where 
we saw a surge of public Muslim support for the BJP in the 
period ahead of the election, but little actual electoral sup-
port for the party: there was no single parliamentary constitu-
ency where Muslims, on average, supported the BJP. To the 
contrary: across all 26 constituencies taken together, the BJP’s 
vote falls by an estimated 0.61 votes with every additional 
Muslim voter in a polling booth while that of the Congress 
increases by an estimated 0.84 votes, controlling for age aver-
age and gender balance. Upon disaggregation, there is little 
change in the fi nding: only in 21 of 181 assembly constituencies 
– notably characterised by economically disadvantaged and 
violently threatened Muslims in a very low proportion relative 
to Hindus-Muslims are likely to moderately support the BJP. 
While the state-level fi nding points to a total rejection of the 
BJP,  spatial disaggregation thus allows a more nuanced reading 
of how voting preferences are localised and depend on more 
factors than merely the religious affi liation of the voter. 
The fractionalised political arena of UP in turn opened up 
more choices for its Muslim electorate, refl ected in even higher 
spatial variation. Similar to Gujarat, we found an overall rejec-
tion of the BJP: across all 80 constituencies, the BJP’s vote falls 
by an estimated 0.28 votes with every additional Muslim voter 
in a polling booth, controlling for age average and gender 
balance. But this fi gure varies from an estimated loss of 0.65 
votes in constituencies such as Muzaffarnagar to a gain of 0.54 
votes in Robertsganj: the variation across constituencies 
is much wider than in Gujarat. Muslims in west UP are more 
likely to reject the BJP than those in the east, and largely 
preferred the SP, with the notable exception of Muzaffarnagar, 
where Muslims preferred the BSP. This is in line with the 
expectation that riot victims penalise the party in power that 
failed to ensure their physical security, and not just the BJP 
per se. Muslim support for the Congress fi nally is fairly concen-
trated in Awadh, BSP support limited and scattered, and sup-
port for AAP only really relevant in Varanasi, where the party’s 
Arvind Kejriwal challenged Narendra Modi.
For both states we further examined the moderating effect 
of violent communalisation. In Gujarat, we fi nd that the BJP’s 
rejection by Muslims is less pronounced in places where deaths 
were higher in 2002 – but these are also places where Muslims 
are in a smaller minority. While the effect of direct violence 
does not necessarily lead to the rejection of the BJP, the larger 
implication is that subordinated groups when too small a 
minority are less likely to be able to forge their own group 
interests and, subsequently, more vulnerable to socially 
conforming behaviours. In UP, the effect of the Muzaffarnagar 
riots was most strongly felt in the Muzaffarnagar town 
itself as discussed above – and largely led to a punishment of 
the ruling SP, besides a continued rejection of the BJP. Yet, 
the rejection of certain parties as an effect of communal 
violence does not explain whom the Muslims of UP did posi-
tively vote for, given the greater choice they bore unlike their 
counterparts in the bipolar political arena of Gujarat. One 
factor that partly explains support rather than rejection is 
ethnic coordination: Muslims were twice more likely to vote 
for the Congress and SP in places where the parties nominated 
a Muslim candidate. 
In conclusion, we found that public Muslim support for the 
BJP did not translate into electoral support in most places. More 
importantly, however, we found tremendous spatial variation 
in Muslim vote pattern, especially in UP: Muslim voting prefer-
ences are localised and spatially variable across and within 
constituencies. Adding to this complexity, the explanatory power 
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Notes
 1 Both raw data and statistical scripts for our 
models are available under a Creative Com-
mons CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0 licence from https:// 
www. raphael-susewind.de/blog/2014/data-
epw. We explicitly encourage replication and 
further inquiry.
 2 To our knowledge, this linguistic algorithm is 
the only one available today to probabilistically 
infer religion from names in India, where offi -
cial data on religion is handled fairly restrictive 
but name lists of various kinds are readily 
available. The algorithm primarily matches the 
names of electors and their named relatives 
against a master name list obtained from 
indiachildnames.com, consolidating spelling 
variants through fuzzy soundex technology. 
Names missing from this master name list were 
further classifi ed by comparing their 3gram 
profi les to those of known names in the same 
assembly segment (cf Schnell et al 2013). To 
assess classifi cation accuracy, we drew a 
random stratifi ed sample of fi ve names from 
each assembly segment in both states and man-
ually classifi ed them as Muslim or non-Muslim. 
Against this “gold standard”, the algorithm 
achieves positive and negative predictive 
values of 82% and 97%, respectively in Gujarat 
and of 87% and 96%, respectively in Uttar 
Pradesh; the accuracy of booth level estimates 
will improve further since errors in either 
direction cancel each other out during aggre-
gation. The remaining tendency to slightly 
over-estimate Muslim elector percentages 
remains inconsequential for our model since 
we have no reason to assume spatial variation 
in the extent of such overestimation. 
 3 For this purpose, all booths with subsequent 
ID numbers which share the same station 
name (minus any numbers) were grouped, 
so that booths named “Primary school XYZ 
room 1”, “Primary school XYZ room 2”, etc, 
were considered to belong to the same physical 
polling station.
 4 Variation of Muslim percentage across booths 
within one physical polling station occurs for 
various reasons, including street-wise segrega-
tion within the area covered by this station (an 
average 300 metres circle in urban areas). Even 
though inter-ethnic relations depend greatly 
on street networks (e g, Grannis 1998, 2009), 
most people in our ethnographic experience 
tend to attribute “Muslimness” to neighbour-
hoods or villages rather than to smaller spatial 
entities. Therefore, we assume that the experi-
ential level of “Muslimness” only begins to dif-
fer from station to station and not within. Like-
wise, any deliberate manipulation of booth 
composition by the state, for instance the con-
centration of “vulnerable groups” in certain 
booths where they could be give police protec-
tion, is more likely to occur between polling 
stations than within them. 
 5 To test this assumption, we ran a separate lin-
ear model which attempts to explain difference 
in turnout percentage compared to station 
mean through difference in Muslim electorate 
percentage to station mean. The R2 of this 
model remains below .01 in both Gujarat and 
Uttar Pradesh, and rarely rises above .05 in any 
assembly segment or constituency in either 
state, suggesting that Muslim and non-Muslim 
turnouts do not differ within the tight spatial 
bracket of a polling station.
 6 Since the number of multi-booth stations can 
shrink drastically in some assembly segments, 
we had to exclude a few such segments because 
our model could not successfully run any-
more; this was the case for Dangs (assembly 
segment 173) in Gujarat, and for Kishani (109), 
Karhal (110), Purwa (167), Sarojini Nagar (170), 
Isauli (187), Sultanpur (188), Tirwa (197), 
Rasulabad (205), Sirathu (251), Manjhanpur 
(252), Phaphamau (254), Pratappur (257), Bara 
(264), Milkipur (273), Tanda (278), Alapur (279), 
Jalalpur (280), Gainsari (292), Mahadewa (311) 
and Chillupar (328) in Uttar Pradesh. Data 
from these assembly segments did however 
contribute to constituency- and statewide 
model estimates.
 7 The original data sets list riot deaths on census 
town level; these were spatially matched to the 
relevant assembly segment.
 8 There is widely tested scholarship on the role 
of political elites in orchestrating violence in 
India, especially in close electoral races, where 
political parties can win votes by raising divi-
sive symbolic issues related to ethnic identity 
(e g, work on UP riots in Brass 2005; Wilkinson 
2004). 
 9 The religious identity of candidates was manu-
ally coded as Muslim/non-Muslim.
10 Again, the original data sets were spatially 
matched to the relevant assembly segment.
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of our “vote bank” model also varies spatially: bloc voting 
matters in some areas but not in others – and in most, electoral 
choices depend much more on other factors than on religious 
identity. Fortunately, much more fi ne-grained analyses into 
these complexities are possible with the advent of recent 
e-government and open-data initiatives on the one hand and 
progress in big data analytics on the other. We hope that this 
paper and the simultaneous publication of our raw data set 
inspires further disaggregated inquiry into the only seemingly 
simple question: how do Muslims vote?
